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A week ago, on September 2, South Korea’s Prime Minister chaired the inaugural meeting of the Offshore Wind Power Committee in Seoul. The very creation of this committee was a declaration in itself: South Korea has officially ended the old development model of the past five years, in which offshore wind projects were “approved but rarely built, and advanced at a snail’s pace.”
A few numbers explain why a reset was unavoidable — South Korea’s cumulative offshore wind installed capacity stands at just 0.2 GW, a mere 1% of the 14.3 GW target it had set for 2030.
TL;DR
Model shift: The “European-style path,” in which developers independently searched for sea areas, engaged with residents, and ran through approvals item by item, has been fully replaced by a state-led model of “government-planned site selection + tendering to select developers.” Offshore wind has been elevated to a national strategic priority under the direct oversight of the Prime Minister.
Approval revolution: 42 permits consolidated into a single implementation plan review; the target construction cycle compressed from an average of 10 years to 2.5 years.
Rules rewritten: The bid price weight cut from 60% to 50%, the industrial economic benefit weight raised from 16% to 26%, and a new 8% indicator added for local base construction and O&M capability.
New targets: 25 GW of cumulative installed capacity by 2035, with annual tendering of no less than 4 GW; 1.8 GW already tendered in the first half of 2026, with the first project competition ratio exceeding 2:1.
Why the Old Model Failed: Not a Lack of Ambition, but a Mismatched Path
South Korea was never short on planning ambition. A 14.3 GW target for 2030 ranks among the most aggressive in the world. But the gap between vision and reality was glaring: before the reform began, cumulative installed capacity stood at just 0.2 GW — 14.3 GW planned, only 1% delivered.
The problem was not resource endowment but the development mechanism. The old model was copied directly from Europe: developers independently sought out sea areas, engaged with local residents, and processed permits item by item. The European model works because it rests on mature sea-use institutions, clearly defined departmental responsibilities, and decades of accumulated community trust. South Korea replicated it in an institutional vacuum, and the result was friction at every turn:
From site selection to grid connection, a project took an average of 8–10 years.
Developers had to coordinate with 10 competent authorities — the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and power utilities each governed separate pieces, leaving the approval process fragmented.
Site-selection conclusions were often only finalized late in the project cycle; many projects had been advancing for years before their sites were even settled.
Resistance from coastal fishing communities was frequent, leaving a large number of projects stuck at the planning stage, unable to move into construction.
In a word: permits multiplied, but turbines never rose. The old development model had completely failed — this reform was not a preemptive move but one forced by reality.
Four Major Reforms: Absorbing Uncertainty Before Sea Areas Are Granted
The new system is anchored in the Special Act on the Promotion and Fostering of Offshore Wind Power, with four core directions.
First, site selection authority moves to the government: from “developers find the site” to “the government provides the site.”
The government weighs multidimensional data — wind energy resources, ecological environment, fishery production, maritime traffic — to proactively screen suitable sea areas, build a site-selection information platform, designate preliminary development zones and formal development zones, and then select developers through tendering.
The essential change is that front-end comprehensive assessment has shifted from developers to the government. Environmentally sensitive zones, shipping conflicts, and fishery disputes — the most uncertain factors — are now absorbed by the government before sea areas are granted. Developers no longer “gamble on luck.”
Second, the approval process is drastically streamlined: 42 permits → one implementation plan.
The original 42 permits have been consolidated into a single implementation plan review. The Offshore Wind Power Committee coordinates cross-departmental conflicts of interest, replacing fragmented licensing with one-stop approval. The goal is direct: compress the construction cycle from an average of 10 years to 2.5 years.
Third, environmental review is brought forward, with phased assessment.
Before the government designates development sea areas, it first completes marine and environmental impact surveys; when a winning developer submits its implementation plan, only changes or omissions require supplementary assessment.
This is a precise strike at the old model’s biggest pain point — “spending tens of millions of dollars on front-end surveys, only to see the project founder at the environmental review stage.” Environmental review risk has been moved forward to the government’s planning phase, so developers no longer bear the sunk costs alone.
Fourth, local benefit consultation is institutionalized: “dividing the pie” replaces “placating.”
Local governments form government-citizen consultative committees of 15–25 members, with residents and fishers accounting for no less than 50%.
Sea area occupation fees from offshore wind are channeled into a fishery development support fund.
For large clusters of 1 GW or more, power utilities invest first to build shared grid-connection facilities, with generation companies repaying the construction costs pro rata over time.
Coastal community resistance was the old model’s toughest obstacle. South Korea has chosen to replace piecemeal communication with institutionalized benefit distribution — turning “confrontation” into “joint consultation.”
Bidding Rules Rewritten: No Longer Solely About the Lowest Price
The bid scoring rules have also been adjusted, with notable weight shifts: the bid price weight has been cut from 60% to 50%, down 10 percentage points; the industrial economic benefit weight (covering supply chain security and public benefits) has been raised substantially from 16% to 26%, also a 10-point shift; and a new “local base construction and O&M capability” indicator has been added, carrying an 8% weight.
The message behind these weight adjustments is clear: the government is no longer chasing the lowest electricity price alone; it now values partners who can anchor the local industrial chain and deliver reliably over the long term.
Offshore wind is an asset-heavy industry with operating cycles of more than 20 years. The short-term electricity-price gains from a low bid are far outweighed by the long-term risk of runaway O&M failures later. South Korea is using its bidding rules to screen directly for partners who can “go the distance.”
New Targets and Early Results: Market Confidence Is Returning
The committee has set new development targets: 25 GW of cumulative offshore wind installed capacity by 2035, with annual tendering of no less than 4 GW.
Early results are already visible:
In the first half of 2026, 1.8 GW was tendered, with 5 projects totaling 1,786 MW selected.
For the first time since the tendering system was introduced in 2022, the project competition ratio exceeded 2:1.
A competition ratio above 2:1 means that, on average, more than two developers are competing for each project. The old model’s pattern of projects drawing “no bidders” or being “dominated by a single player” is changing — market confidence in South Korea’s offshore wind sector is returning.
The First Flagship Project: The 2.13 GW Jindo County Integrated Cluster
The first benchmark of the new model has emerged: Pacifico Energy Korea has been selected as the exclusive developer for Phase 2 of the 2.13 GW Jindo County offshore wind integrated cluster.
Jindo is located in South Jeolla Province on Korea’s southwest coast, one of the regions with the best offshore wind resource endowment in the country. A single cluster of 2.13 GW would rank among the world’s largest. This project will test whether the new system can truly move from paper to the sea.
Conclusion: An Institutional Rebuild Aimed at 2035
At its core, this reform answers a question that every emerging market must confront: at a stage where the institutional foundation is weak, social conflicts are complex, and the industrial ecosystem has yet to take shape, who should lead offshore wind development?
South Korea’s answer: the government absorbs the front-end uncertainty, and the market is responsible for efficiency and delivery. Site selection, environmental review, and community coordination — the toughest bones to crack — are tackled by the government first, while developers focus on engineering construction and long-term O&M.
For markets accelerating their offshore wind buildouts — China, Japan, Southeast Asia — South Korea’s “scrap and restart” offers a rare institutional reference. Its success or failure is well worth watching closely.